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The start of Donald Trump’s second term is often seen as the key moment in the unravelling of the post-World War II ‘rules-based’ international order. Of course, the order in question started unravelling much earlier when major powers violated it with relative impunity. This order had also long been criticized by the powers that were not satisfied with the rules it was based on and wanted them replaced by different rules that they found more advantageous to themselves. 

What is new about Trump’s second term is his indifference or outright contempt for rules as such. Instead of an order based on any kind of rules, Trump’s foreign policy rather envisions an order established by making deals, which are neither based on nor subject to any rules, but reinvent rules each time anew.

This style of policy-making has been described as transactional, give-and-take, where the measure of success is taking more than one gives, hence the obsession of the administration with the US not being taken for a ‘sucker’ who gives more than one takes. 

This approach envisions policy as a zero-sum game, in which there can only be winners and losers, in contrast to the positive-sum game enabled by the rules-based order, in which everyone can benefit from the rules in question.

With allies abandoned, making deals with rivals becomes more complicated

This approach explains the persistent puzzle of Trump’s approach, which treats US longtime allies far worse than its rivals or enemies. Since allies are already on one’s side, they can be taken for granted and, moreover, can be suspected of being free riders who treat the US as a sucker that keeps losing from their gains. On the other hand, rivals or enemies are those one can bargain with in the hope of taking more than one gives in accordance with the zero-sum logic.

Trump’s approach is nonetheless problematic both in its design and its execution. 

While a transactional and zero-sum approach is often associated with political realism, its design is not very realistic. 

The disruption of rules in favor of aggressive bargaining and ad hoc deals raises transaction costs, increasing the likelihood of no longer a zero but a negative-sum game, in which everyone loses. Abandoning allies in the fear of being taken for a sucker weakens one’s bargaining position vis a vis rivals or enemies, who might even gain support from these disgruntled former allies. Making deals with rivals thus becomes more rather less complicated and it is never guaranteed that in these deals one ends up taking more than one gives.

The approach did not have a stellar record during Trump’s first term

This brings us to Trump’s record in the execution of this approach, which was not exactly stellar during his first term. His attempts at a nuclear deal with North Korea did not diminish the latter’s nuclear capability despite US concessions regarding joint military exercises with South Korea, while creating tensions in relations with the latter and other allies in the region.

The deal with the Taliban in 2020 involved the withdrawal of US and NATO troops in exchange for a vague commitment to ‘intra-Afghan dialogue’ that never really materialized. 

Since the Afghan government of the time was not a party to the deal, it was perceived as abandoned by the US which contributed to its quick fall in 2021.

In both cases there is a pattern of dealing with former enemies at the cost to current allies that either leads to nothing or yields unilateral concessions.

Trump’s disruptive style risks becoming predictable

It is therefore exceedingly difficult to recognize the author of The Art of the Deal as excelling in the art in question. On the contrary, what Trump excelled in during his first term was not making deals but breaking them, getting out of the deals already made, be it the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris Accords.

For all his talk about deals, it appears that Trump’s transactionalism ends up constrained by deals as much as it is by rules: he is interested in deals only to disrupt any existing arrangements without being committed to constructing something to replace them. Those expecting Trump’s presidency to result in some grand new deal dividing up the world are therefore likely to end up disappointed as much as the advocates of the rules-based order are today.

One can only prolong this disappointment by lamenting the disruption of the rules-based order by someone whose entire success in politics derives from his promise to do so. 

All that one achieves thereby is the validation that Trump is indeed good at what he set out to do.

It would be more useful to focus instead on the art of the deal that Trump talks about but rarely demonstrates. However erratic, his disruptive style risks becoming predictable, making it easy for his counterparts to anticipate and prepare for his moves. As the shock of disruption wears off, the artist of the deal may end up losing the games he prefers. 

It remains to be seen whether the sum of these games will be zero or less.

The author Sergei Prozorov is Professor of Political Science at the Ä¢¹½Ö±²¥.