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How is social order possible? While some may argue that the mere questions indicates traditional Durkheimian thinking, most sociologists would still argue, that is the very basic sociological question. In Social Work scholars seem to be more reluctant to agree on a basic 鈥淪ocial Work question鈥�.

The practice of Social Work is often analysed from a more or less sociological view. Social Work, it is argued, processes social problems. What these problems are is considered as contested. Some maintain that social problems violate prevalent social norms, standards and expectations, others highlight that social problems are results of social constructions and labelling processes. In fact the two positions are not so different: Within processes of 鈥榮ocial problem work鈥� practices and states of person are institutional successfully defined as 鈥� actually or potentially - deviant from social norms in a way that calls for public 鈥� as the case may be 鈥榩reventive鈥� 鈥� correction, compensation, support or normalisation in a way that is delivered by people processing and people changing welfare services. Such reactions to social problems might be described as 鈥榮ocial control鈥�. If Social Work is regarded as an institution of social control the basic question is still 鈥渉ow social order possible鈥�? In more practical terms Social Work is about the possibly to implement social order vis a vis deviant subjects.

While a large number of scholars seem to accept that Social Work is about social problems, the number of scholars accepting that Social Work is about social control is seemingly smaller. A number of scholars uneasily insist that Social Work has to be something more benign, friendly and outgoing. Social Work reacts to social problems but it does so in terms of peculiar ethic stemming from its claim to be an empowering human rights profession or something similar. While being ethically sympathetic to this view, I cannot see that being a 鈥榟uman rights profession鈥� is a syllogistically conclusive deduction from a sociological description of Social Work as a reaction to social problems. The concept of social problems aggregates heterogeneous troubles of social cohabitation in so far as these may be conceptualized as malfunctions of the societal order. I would agree to conceptualize Social Work as a 鈥榟uman rights profession鈥� if there would be sound reason the suggest that the violation of human rights is the subject matter of Social Work. For most European countries citizenship rights are more far-reaching and legally more sustained than human rights, but it is also not convincing to conceptualize Social Work as a civil rights profession. Actually there is little reason to understand Social Work at all as a 鈥榬ights鈥� profession.

I think it is more convincing to formulate the basic question of Social Work in social-pedagogical terms. This perspective accepts that the practice Social Work is about problematical features in a subject-society-relation. Yet the focus is not the social order but rather the concrete life practices and forms of life of human subjects. The basic social-pedagogical question is How is subjectivity possible given and despite the fact of society (respectively the fact of a particular social order)? From this perspective the Social Work problem is about constellations where humans are marooned from their opportunities and capacities to flourish. Compared to more common terms like welfare or well-being the notion of 鈥榟uman flourishing鈥� sounds old fashioned or odd. Indeed the notion rises from a perfectionist tradition. For some good and broad number of deficient reasons the theoretical discourse of social work has released itself from perfectionist thinking. This allowed to eclipse and sidestep rather than to resolve the analytical problems arising from the fact, that Social Work is perfectionist practice. Basically perfectionism is the view that how well we may engage in the development and exercise of our capacities - as for instance rationality, creativity, understanding, craft, imagination etc. 鈥� is decisive for the quality of our lives (cf. Ferdman 2019) As Erik Olin Wright (2012: 4) points out, flourishing is 鈥渓east vulnerable to a purely subjective interpretation and most systematically shaped by social conditions. It refers to the various ways people are able to develop their talents and capacities, to realize their potentials as human beings. The concept does not privilege one kind of capacity over another. These capacities are intellectual, physical, artistic, spiritual, social, and moral. A flourishing human life is one in which these talents and capacities develop鈥�, and thus a life that people have reason to value and that is worthy of their dignity. Taking this serious Social Work is about whether and how humans are able to formulate, articulate and give weight to their own preferences, aspirations and expectations instead of merely subjugating themselves to external demands and impositions or to merely adopt and assimilate to prevalent circumstances and conditions, it is about absence or availability of meaningful and resonant social relations 鈥� or as I would prefer 鈥榬elations of concern鈥� 鈥� , and it is about the capacity or powers of humans to forward projects in their lives, which they may appropriate and with which they may affectual identify themselves.

While there cannot be any doubt that suffering or deficits in human flourishing are a result of social causes and not just a result of 鈥榥ature鈥�, it would be flawed to suggest that flourishing is independent of ecological opportunities and boundaries: Environment and nature create some of the fundamental conditions of the possibility of human flourishing.

We may acknowledge that post-modernist and (de-)constructivist approaches to Social Work have long been successful to de-ontologize and de-naturalise theoretical thinking in Social Work (as well as in other parts of social science). Yet there are several good reasons why realism is back on the scientific agenda. If it is convincing that Social Work is about human flourishing, there is reason to suggest that any sound attempt to formulate a theory of Social Work has little alternative but to develop a social-ecological perspective. This is not just because, as Martha Nussbaum (2006: 77) - one of the currently most important philosophers on the issue of human flourishing 鈥� suggests, 鈥渂eing able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature鈥� is one of the universally central capabilities allowing a flourishing human life, but also and foremost, because there is no good reason for Social Work theory further ignore the role of the natural environment.

I have no doubts that theoretical accounts that describe Social Work as an institution and practice of social control aiming at maintaining social order by preventing deviance, may ignore any account to nature. Yet if Social Work is about human flourishing it may not.

More precisely if
1) Social Work is about human flourishing and
2) accounts to the fact that the natural environment has at least an instrumental role in enabling human capabilities to flourish, than
3) Social Work theory has to formulate some reason why to ignore issues about the possibilities to enhance and protect the conditions of flourishing attributable to the natural environment.

The widespread ignorance towards issues of the natural environment within most Social Work seems to be grounded on arbitrary and merely decisionistic reason. The fact, for instance, that Social Work is a welfare institution which in most countries has no administrative mandate towards environmental issues might describe of some given institutional deficits but it is no theoretical argument. A sound reason would be that environment is something beyond human control. But this is not the case. Human practice systematically impacts on environment and creates, mediates or mitigates massive inequities and inequalities with respect to the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. There is empirical reason to suggest that this often happens to the disadvantage of also otherwise socially vulnerable individuals and communities.

A danger that an ecological Social Work might be about patronizing these vulnerable people to behave 鈥榤ore ecological鈥� is actually real. However victim-blaming is a common problem within Social Work and not a particular problem of a socio-ecological formulation of Social Work. Scholars like Breena Holland (2008) have convincingly argued that a sustainable ecological capacity might be regarded as a meta-capability for realising a flourishing life. How to grasp and how to enable this kind of capability is a major challenge of Social Work theory and practice. The fact that there is hitherto only little empirical knowledge and even less compelling theoretical argument about the role of Social Work to this challenge does not mean that ignoring it is a viable alternative.

Ferdman, Avigail 2019:
A Perfectionist Basic Structure. In: Philosophy and Social Criticism 45, 7: 862鈥�82
Holland, Breena 2008: Justice and the environment in Nussbaum's 鈥榗apabilities approach鈥�: why sustainable ecological capacity is a meta-capability. In: Political Research Quarterly, 61, 2: 319鈥�332
Nussbaum, Martha 2006:
Frontiers of Justice. Cambride: Belknap
Wright, Erik Olin 2012: Transforming Capitalism through Real Utopias. In: American Sociological Review 78, 1: 1鈥�25

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